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Elsana: Legal Pluralism and Indigenous Peoples Rights

LEGAL PLURALISM AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS:
CHALLENGES IN LITIGATION AND RECOGNITION OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS
Dr. Morad Elsana *
“Countries that have succeeded in integrating traditional law into their formal
legal systems have found that justice [was] done more effectively . . . .”1
Rodolfo Stavenhagen

ABSTRACT
This article discusses the contribution of legal pluralism to the
recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples. It presents the options
(and their shortcomings) of recognizing land rights of indigenous
peoples, with special emphasis on litigation using postcolonial states’
law. It shows that litigation of indigenous rights through national states’
law suffers from fundamental problems, mainly an inherent conflict
between interests and goals, and thus it ‘suffers’ from a limitation on the
results it produces; namely, it does not result in the recognition of
indigenous rights.2 On the legal principle level, the legal system does not
include indigenous peoples’ rights, does not “see” their rights, and even
does not “understand” these rights; and is therefore incapable of
recognizing them. This article shows that only through “systemic”
structural change of the states’ legal system, and specifically, the
adoption of indigenous legal systems as another source for rights,
postcolonial states’ legal systems would be able to "see" and “recognize”
indigenous rights. To demonstrate this, the article, through presenting
and analyzing the legal struggle of the Bedouin in the State of Israel,
shows the limitation of the modern states’ legal system and the failure of
litigation through this system to recognize indigenous Bedouin rights.

* Dr. Elsana is a visiting assistant professor of law at Californian Western School of Law, fellow of the
Israel Institute. Until recently, during a year of post-doc research, he served as an adjunct professor at the
University of Maryland. Prior, he served as a professor of Public International Law, International Human
Rights Law, and International Humanitarian Law. Dr. Elsana holds a Doctorate degree of Juridical Science
(S.J.D) from the American University, Washington College of Law.
1. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, THE EMERGENCE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 59 (2012).
2. One must remember that this system was intended, and has been used, to serve the states’
primary interest in land possession.

1043

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019

1

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 4

1044

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

Abstract .............................................................................................. 1043
I. Introduction .................................................................................... 1044
II. The Bedouin land issue and the legal disputes .............................. 1046
A. Attempts to Resolve the Conflict ........................................ 1049
B. Alhawashelah and Al-Uqbi:................................................ 1049
C. Al-Uqbi Decision in the High Court (Justice Hayut 2014). 1051
D. Legal Autonomy: Rights According to the Traditional
Law: ................................................................................... 1051
E. The Failure of Solution Attempts and the ‘Contra’ of the
Bedouin Law ...................................................................... 1052
F. The Dilemmas and Shortcomings of the Existing Legal
Solution Approach ............................................................. 1054
G. A Theoretically Intractable Issue ........................................ 1056
III. Recognition of the Land Rights of Indigenous Peoples ............... 1057
A. Recognition of Indigenous Rights ...................................... 1058
B. The Recognition of Customary Law in Other Countries:
The Richtersveld Case in South Africa: ............................. 1060
C. The Case of Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community
in Nicaragua ....................................................................... 1061
IV. Legal pluralism: Recognition of indigenous land ........................ 1062
A. Indigenous Peoples and Legal Pluralism: From Exclusion
to Recognition .................................................................... 1063
1. Exclusion of Customary Law: ................................. 1064
2. The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ Law ........ 1066
V. Legal Pluralism in Israel ............................................................... 1068
A. Can Legal Pluralism Promote Bedouin Rights? ................. 1069
B. In Israel & the Negev .......................................................... 1071
VI. Conclusion ................................................................................... 1074

I. INTRODUCTION
The Bedouin land rights issue is an ongoing dispute between the
Bedouin and the State of Israel that has preoccupied the parties for 50
years. The dispute severely damages both sides on all levels. Recently,
the dispute has begun to present new threats, including threatening core
issues on the relationship between the Bedouin and the State of Israel,
such as changes in Bedouin identity and sense of belonging. 3
For many years, the Bedouin and the state have been trying to resolve
3. For recent changes on the Bedouin youth identity, as a result of land demolition (part of the
land issue), see Hani Abu Awad, Bedouin Children Under the Shadow of Government Home Demolition
Policy: A Study of Education and Identity, 90 (2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Howard University)
(on file with author).
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the dispute through various ways, but without success. In the past two
decades, the state has been putting special emphasis on solving the issue
in legal ways, namely, litigation. But even though the state wins in the
courts, this victory does not solve the problem—after losing in the legal
process, the Bedouin did not move from (or release) the land, instead they
continued to live on their land. As a result in most cases, neither the state
nor the Bedouin can use the land.
The Bedouin continue to struggle for their land rights. Inspired by other
indigenous peoples’ experiences, as part of their efforts to push the court
to recognize Bedouin land rights, they approached the court with
“indigenous arguments” to extract a decision that recognizes Bedouin
land rights. These efforts failed when the court rejected their test case, the
Al-Uqbi tribe's land settlement lawsuit, and all their claims to recognize
their lands. The court restated the legal basis it has cited over the years,
drawing on a very old Ottoman legal doctrine. That legal basis states that
the land the Bedouin claim was Mawat Land and, therefore, the State of
Israel does not recognize the Bedouin’s customary land rights.4
This article examines the Bedouin land issue and shows that the focus
of the efforts on traditional litigation to resolve the issue is one of the main
problems of the present scholarship and advocacy. It shows that the
Bedouin land problem is not a “classical” real estate case such as a dispute
on land or property ownership that could be approached and resolved
through conventional legal arguments, but rather is a complex land rights
issue intertwined with historical, political, and cultural aspects.
While the bulk of the research has focused on revoking the “mawat”
doctrine,5 or the land settlement ordinance, this article presents the subject
from a new, different point of view that has not yet been examined. It
examines the issue from the perspective of legal pluralism. It offers a legal
alternative that can promote not only the settlement of Bedouin land
rights, but also a new framework that aims to regulate other Bedouin
rights.
To present a clear picture of the issue, this article first presents the land
problem of the Bedouin in Part II. Then, in the next section, it traces
similar cases from the world and examines the ways in which legal
pluralism promotes the recognition of indigenous peoples’ land
entitlement and addresses and solves similar conflicts, with a particular
emphasis on the doctrine of legal pluralism involving indigenous

4. Mawat land is a barren or unclaimed land owned by the state, such as forests, mountainous
areas, deserts, and the like. See George Bisharat, Land, Law, and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied
Territories,
43
AM.
U.
L.
REV.,
467,
493–94
(1994),
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol43/iss2/3.
5. Cf. Oren Yiftachel, Alexander (Sandy) Kedar & Ahmad Amara, Re-Examining the ‘Dead
Negev Doctrine’: Property Rights in the Bedouin-Arab Space, 14 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL (2012).
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customary legal systems. The article then presents legal pluralism on two
levels: (1) on the level of international comparative law and (2) on the
level of Israeli national law. It shows that the legal system in Israel is also
pluralistic and therefore has a capacity to adopt similar solutions for the
Bedouin land issue, based on the doctrine of legal pluralism, and that the
Israeli legal system includes all the elements required to recognize the
rights of the Bedouin through adopting legal pluralism.
II. THE BEDOUIN LAND ISSUE AND THE LEGAL DISPUTES
The Bedouin land issue in the State of Israel is a dispute over the
ownership of about 1.5 million dunams of land.6 On the one hand, relying
on their customary law and evidence from the Ottoman and the British
periods, the Bedouin claim that this land belongs to them. On the other
hand, the state, relying on the state’s property law (including the Ottoman
land act), claims that the Bedouin lands are state land and the Bedouin
have no ownership rights to these lands.7
The problem arose in the early 1970s, after the state refused to
recognize the land rights of the Bedouin, as part of the state’s land
settlement project, according to the Land Rights Settlement Ordinance
(1969),8 which required the Bedouin to file lawsuits for their land. In the
early 1970s, the Bedouin filed about 3,200 lawsuit claims for about
1,200,000 dunams of land.9 (There were additional claims for about
150,000-200,000 dunams consisting of 20% of Bedouin land claims,
where that the state prevented the Bedouin from filing claims on these
lands, claiming, mainly, that these lands were expropriated in the
1950s).10 After the Bedouin filed their claims, the state demanded that
each plaintiff present evidence to prove ownership of the land.
At the beginning, most of the Bedouin did not present documents and
the claims remained “untouched” (or unprocessed) until the early ‘70s11
when the state decided to expropriate the lands of one Bedouin tribe called
Alhawashelah that resides in Gasr-Asser village, near Dimona.12 This was
6. The numbers are presented differently in different sources. See Oren Yiftachel, and Eli
Atzmon, and Ghazi Falah.
7. See the state's arguments as presented in the court's decision in Salim Alhawashelah v. State
of Israel, 38(3) PD 141 (1974) (Isr.).
8. LAND
RIGHTS
SETTLEMENT
ORDINANCE
[REVISED],
5729-,
(1969),
https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/Law01/286_031.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2018).
9. Shlomo Swirski & Yael Hasson, INVISIBLE CITIZENS: ISRAEL GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD
THE NEGEV BEDOUIN 19 (2006).
10. Yiftachel, Kedar, and Amara, supra note 5 at 50 (fn 158) Hebrew Version.
11. Id. at 50.
12. There have been few cases on Bedouin land, but they did not set a precedent in this matter. See
the case of Alkalab (1989) and Abu Solb v. Israel Land Authority, Civil Appeal 518/86, P.D. 43(4), 297
(1986).
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the first case in which the land rights of the Bedouin were subjected to the
legal test on the merits of the land rights of the Bedouin. After discussing
the land rights of the Alhawashelah tribe, the District Court in Beer Sheva
city rejected the tribe’s ownership claim, finding that the land is a
“Mawat” type of land, by use of which term the court inferred that the
Bedouin do not have ownership rights under Israeli law. The court stated
that, as long as there is no proof of “revival” (Ihyaa) of the Mawat land
(i.e., that the land should not be designated “Mawat”), the tribe has no
ownership rights to the land.13 The members of the Alhawashelah tribe
appealed to the High Court, which also rejected their claim. The High
Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the land was “Mawat” land
and ownership of the land was held by the state.14 This decision created
the well-known Alhawashelah precedent, which states: all Bedouin lands
are “Mawat” land and the Bedouin have no rights to these lands.15
It should be noted that the court founded its decision on an opinion
submitted by the state based on a report of a government committee
headed by Ms. Plia Albeck, the Commissioner of Settlements in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories (hereinafter, the Albeck Committee
Report).16 As a result of that decision, all Bedouin claims, including the
land counter-claims that were adjudicated later, followed the same
“fate”—rejection on the same grounds.17
As of this writing, the courts in Israel have systematically rejected all
Bedouin claims, not even accepting one Bedouin land ownership claim.
Until this day, not one Bedouin tribe or individual has ever succeeded in
winning a land claim case.
For the Bedouin in the Negev, the state expropriation doctrine that
emerged appears to be a deliberate policy of rejecting their claims and an
act of dispossession of their land—not a fair and objective process of
clarifying their land rights.18 For this reason, a majority of Bedouin
stopped applying to the court for claims to clarify their ownership of the
land.
In a commendable but short term and ultimately ill-fated backtracking,
13. DC (Beer Sheva) 1/69 Alhawashelah v. State of Israel (1969), (Not published).
14. See C.A. 218/74 Salim Alhawashelah v. State of Israel (1974), PD38(3) 141.
15. Id.
16. Haaertz Service, Plia Albeck, Who Paved Legal Way for 100 Settlements, Dies, HAARETZ,
(Sept. 27, 2005), https://www.haaretz.com/1.4875925 (last visited Dec. 3, 2018); SWIRSKI and HASSON,
supra note 9 at 9 (FN 4) (Ms. Plia Albeck also served in this position in the 1980s, during which she
granted permission to establish more than 100 Israeli settlements on Palestinian land in the Palestinian
territories, under the pretext that they are state land).
17. Abraham Halima, Negev lands from the Legal Perspective, INSTITUTE FOR LAND POLICY
AND LAND USE- DEPT. OF LAND POLICY (1985).
18. See Amer Alhuzayel, LAND OWNERSHIP IN THE NEGEV BETWEEN THE FACTS OF HISTORY AND
FALSIFICATION OF ZIONISM (2006), http://deyaralnagab.net/main.php?content=13&id=61 (last visited
Sept. 8, 2018).
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from around the 80s until the 90s,19 the state opted, temporarily, to
abandon its foregoing litigation approach of negatively determining the
land rights of the Bedouin and attempted to settle Bedouin land claims
through negotiation. Different plans with different offers were presented
and proposed to Bedouin claimants but, unfortunately, no real progress
was made.20
In 2007, the government formulated the Negev Plan for the Regulation
of Bedouin Settlement in the Negev.21 As part of this plan, the
government appointed a government committee headed by retired
Supreme Court Justice Eliezer Goldberg to propose a solution to this issue
(the Goldberg Committee). The Goldberg Committee met and discussed
the land issue of the Bedouin and issued a short report that proposed a
solution, but even this solution was not acceptable to the Bedouin. On the
contrary, the Bedouin, who did not participate in the Committee's
decision-making process, strongly opposed the findings of the Goldberg
Committee.22
Despite the Bedouin’s rejection of the findings and recommendations,
the state proceeded with the Negev Plan, adopted the recommendations
of the Goldberg Committee, and submitted the recommendations as a bill,
which became law known as the Prawer Law. This move led to a
rebellion, including unprecedented demonstrations and acts of violence in
the Negev by the Bedouin population, which was expressed in large-scale
public opposition23 that eventually led to suspension of the Plan. 24
The government continued to expropriate land from the Bedouin
through a special legal procedure called “counter claims.” All the Bedouin
protests and claims of injustice did not lead to a change of the state's
19. following the conclusions of the Albeck Committee which recommended compensating the
Bedouin for their rights to land
20. For example, between 2005 and 2010, the government invited a mediation report from the
Consensus Building Institute (CBI), a US institute that helps leaders collaborate with people to understand
and solve complex problems. (See the organization’s website in which describes CBI work to understand
the Bedouin land Issue. Resolving Conflicts between the Israeli Government and Bedouin Stakeholders |
Consensus Building Institute, https://www.cbi.org/case/resolving-conflicts-between-the-israeligovernment-and-bedouin-stakeholders/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
21. The Bedouin criticized the plan, claiming that it was actually only another plan for regulating
the Bedouin lands to take over their land at minimal cost.
22. See the opposing positions of the Bedouin committee members: Ahmad Al-Assad and Faisal
Al-Huzail in the Goldberg Committee report. The Regional Council for the Unrecognized Villages in the
Negev-RCUV,
Goldberg
Commission’s
Recommendations
(2007),
http://www.landpedia.org/landdoc/Analytical_materials/Goldberg_recommendations-english.pdf.
23. Hassan Sha'alan Ephraim Mati Sieber, Ahiya Raved, Noam (Dvol) Dvir, Elior Levy and Omri,
Protest and Confrontations against the Bedouin Settlement Plan, YNET, (Nov. 30, 2013),
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4459623,00.html; Shirley Seidler, Jackie Khoury & Yaniv
Kovovitz, Mass Protests in Protests Against the Prawer Program, HAARETZ (Nov. 30, 2013),
https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/education/1.2178739.
24. Moran Azoulay and Itai Blumenthal, Netanyahu shelved the Prawer plan, (Dec. 12, 2013),
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4464682,00.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2018).
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policy. The state has not made any decision that would veer from the
Alhawashelah precedent nor did it offer any recognition of Bedouin land
rights. Moreover, on the political and public levels, many state officials,
including Ministers and representatives of the state (including Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu), categorized the Bedouin as “trespassers”
and “thieves of land” who took over state land.25 In addition, the state
continued to expropriate Bedouin lands and use them for various
purposes, such as settlement and development, but primarily for the
benefit of the Jewish population, while, at the same time, refusing to
recognize Bedouin villages. Only a small part of Bedouin land is used for
the development and establishment of Bedouin townships.26
A. Attempts to Resolve the Conflict
The above does not mean that there were no attempts to solve the
problem. On the contrary, in many cases, the Bedouin tried many times
to resolve the dispute (however, without success).27 On the one hand, for
many years they have been trying to obtain recognition of their land
rights. For this purpose, they are conducting their struggle on several
levels, political, legal, community, and media, to protect their land rights
and preserve their traditional economy. The Bedouin tried all the
traditional ways to achieve recognition of their land rights, including
appealing to the Supreme Court, but all attempts encountered failure and
government resistance. 28
Believing in their historical rights to these lands, the Bedouin applied
to the courts several times, but all their applications have been rejected.
They then appealed to the Supreme Court several times, and had their
claims rejected as well.
B. Alhawashelah and Al-Uqbi:
The first court case was the case of Alhawashelah of 1969 in the Beer

25. See Sami Peretz, the country's biggest mistake in the Negev - and the solution that could make
it an attractive place, THEMARKER, https://www.themarker.com/markerweek/1.4069394 (last visited
Apr. 17, 2018).
26. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OFF THE MAP: LAND AND HOUSING RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN
ISRAEL’S UNRECOGNIZED BEDOUIN VILLAGES 1, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/03/30/map (last
visited Sept. 6, 2016) ("Today they comprise 25 percent of the population of the northern Negev but have
jurisdiction over less than 2 percent of the land there.").
27. The Goldberg Commission was only one of many previous attempts, such as the CBI report,
and the government's proposals to the Bedouin in the vicinity of the Tel-Elmaleh evacuation in the early
1980s.
28. See the case of C.A. 218/74 Salim Alhawashelah v. State of Israel (1974), supra note 19; C.A.
(BS) 7161/06 Suleiman Al-Uqbi et. al. v. State of Israel, (2012).
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Sheva District Court.29 In that case, the central argument by the court was
whether the land in question was mawat land or not, as can be discerned
from the opinion of Justice Halima (p. 143) in the appeal against the
Magistrate Court ruling. He stated:
The appellants had stated in their claim memo that they had filed
with the Land Settlement Department, that they were claiming
ownership of the plots in question by virtue of possession and
processing; but they did not say anything about the type of land for
the plots they claimed. On the other hand, the State raised the issue
of the type of land in dispute when it argued in all the claim
memorandums submitted on its behalf, that the land in all the above
plots is a ‘mawat.’ With this argument raised by the state, this matter
became the main axis in the litigation that took place in court below
and before us.30
Also in the Alhawashelah case (1984) in the Supreme Court, the main
arguments focused on proving land claims under Israeli law. Even when
these arguments were based on Ottoman and English law, everything was
done according to the official Israeli law. Furthermore, when the Bedouin
themselves claimed their rights, their claims were discussed according to
the official law of the state.
In the second round of litigation (2012 and 2014) there were two
decisions: the Al-Uqbi case (District Court (2012) and High Court Appeal
(2014)).31 Although this time, the Bedouin made sure to present
arguments based on their traditional law in the analysis of the Beer Sheva
District Court in 2012 (Judge Dovrat).32 In this case, the issue revolved
around whether the land of the Bedouin (the Plaintiffs) is miri or a mawat
land. Thus, naturally and ostensibly, all the arguments were based on the
official legal system of the state.
The decision of the District Court, as described in the Supreme Court
by Justice Hayut, provides a further picture of the treatment of the
Bedouin’s arguments by the court. During the decision, Justice Hayut
stated that “The court below [District Court] rejected the appellants’
argument that the tribe was not required to register the plots in its name
in the Tabu33 to acquire rights there because the Ottoman authorities and
29. DC (BEER SHEVA) 1/69 Alhawashelah v. State of Israel (1969), supra note 13.
30. C.A. 218/74 Salim Alhawashelah v. State of Israel (1974), supra note 14 at 143.
31. Noa Kram, Al-Uqbi v. The State of Israel: The Concealing of Bedouin Law and History in
Determining Land Ownership in the Negev, Law, Society and Culture, 389, FACULTY OF LAW, TEL AVIV
UNIVERSITY (2017) (Hebrew).
32. C.A. (BS) 7161/06 SULEIMAN AL-UQBI ET. AL. V. STATE OF ISRAEL, supra note 29.
33. Tabu (also Tapu). The term was used to indicate the title deed that certified Tabu rights
(registered land rights), but also mean the Land Registry.
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the Mandatory authorities granted autonomy to the Bedouin in the Negev
and legalized [recognized] land rights acquired according to their
customary Bedouin law.”34
In addition, the court adopted Professor Kark's opinion that in both the
Ottoman and the British Mandate there was no sweeping recognition of
Bedouin ownership of the Negev's lands, preferring it over Prof.
Yiftachel's opinion that the Ottoman regime and the regime of the British
Mandate gave legal validity to the rights acquired under Bedouin
customary law, even without registration in the Land Registry. 35
C. Al-Uqbi Decision in the High Court (Justice Hayut 2014)
In the appeal of the Al-Uqbi tribe, there was another attempt to get the
court to recognize Bedouin rights under their customary law.36 Even
though, this time, the Bedouin demanded recognition of their rights
according to their customary law, they sought to present the issue through
the Ottoman law rather than their customary law and the doctrine of legal
pluralism. They argued that the Ottomans recognized the traditional land
rights of the Bedouin at the time, and not by making an argument based
on legal pluralism. Their argument was based on a “challenge of proofing
the law” that existed before the establishment of the state. The court
rejected that argument in this decision as well.37 In Section 12 of the
decision, the court stated:
On the legal level, the Appellants claim that according to the laws
that applied to the Negev region until the establishment of the State,
the fact that the Al-Uqbi tribe lived in plots for generations gave it
ownership over them. The appellants repeatedly claimed that both
the Ottomans and the Mandatory authorities granted legal autonomy
to the Bedouin to admin their property and lands according to their
customary Bedouin law, and therefore the appellants argued that the
Ottoman Land Law and the Mawat Ordinance did not apply in the
Negev until the establishment of the State, and that the law that
applied in the Negev during the relevant period was Bedouin
customary law.” (Al-Uqbi, 2014, page 12)
D. Legal Autonomy: Rights According to the Traditional Law:
In addition, the Bedouin claimed that the authorities that preceded
34.
35.
36.
37.

C.A 4220/12 Al-Uqbi vs. State of Israel, Nivo 2015, 5–6.
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 12, 31, 34.
Id. at 5–7.
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Israel (the Ottomans and the British Mandate on Palestine) granted the
Bedouin legal autonomy and enabled them to operate according to their
traditional law, as well as to acquire land rights based on their customary
law. Last, the Bedouin claimed to have ownership rights under their
customary law.38 The court ruled that the Bedouin in the Negev had no
legal autonomy in the Ottoman Empire nor during the British Mandate
period.39
To summarize this point, it may be noted that in the first case, the
Bedouin claimed that they possess land rights. In the court's decision,
there is no mention of land rights under customary law, and certainly no
recognition of rights under customary law based on the principles of legal
pluralism. In the second round of litigation, the Al-Uqbi case, a
particularly important change was evident: the emphasis on “customary
law” based arguments in various ways. But despite this, the court rejected
them all without serious debate from the perspective of “indigenous
rights” or legal pluralism.
E. The Failure of Solution Attempts and the ‘Contra’ of the Bedouin
Law
Despite court decisions rejecting Bedouin land rights and declaring the
land to be state land that the Bedouin have no rights to, the issue remains
unsettled. Both sides are dissatisfied with the current situation. As the
Bedouin do not accept the court-based solution, they continue their
struggle in other, non-legal ways—refusing to “release” their land for
other use or give up possession.40 For example, they continue to possess
their land and prevent even other Bedouin from possessing or using their
38. On page 22 (section 34), the court noted that: “After examining the arguments of the parties
on this issue, I believe that the appellant argument regarding the existence of Bedouin autonomy in the
Negev areas prior to the establishment of the state should be rejected. In this context, the Appellants refer
to geographically historical studies in which it was noted that the Ottomans and the Mandatory authorities
had difficulty controlling the Negev region and the Bedouin tribes living there, and attributed little
importance to this area . . . As detailed below, these studies do not substantiate the argument of the
Appellants As if the Bedouin had been granted autonomy in the Negev before the establishment of the
state, which included official recognition by the authorities of traditional Bedouin law in the sense that
the Bedouin were given property rights in the Negev.” Id. at 34.
39. Id. at 29 (Art. 43). Justice Duvrat stated “The Ottoman regime and the Mandatory government
that followed it regarded the Negev as part of the sovereign territory under their control. And the
conclusion from all that is stated in paragraphs 33-43 above is that the appellants were unable to prove
the existence of legal autonomy for the Bedouin in the Negev before the establishment of the State, in
which the aforesaid authorities allowed the Bedouin to acquire property rights in the Negev lands under
traditional Bedouin law.”
40. See the case of the village of Al-Araqib, which was demolished and evacuated more than 130
times, but nevertheless the Bedouin refuse to evacuate and leave their land. Farah Najjar, Israel Destroys
Bedouin
Village
for
the
119th
Time,
Al
Jazeera
(Oct.
3,
2017),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/israel-destroys-bedouin-village-119th-time171003135958243.html.
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disputed land. Recently, the state also discovered that in practice, the
Bedouin continue to control their lands even after the court rules that the
land is state land or the court decides that the Bedouin lands are “Mawat”
land and that the Bedouin had no ownership rights whatsoever. In the
reality of many cases, the Bedouin determine who uses and who buys or
rents their land.
Relying primarily on their customary law, the Bedouin manage to
prevent others from using or buying land belonging to them even after
expropriation by the state. It has recently become clear that in some
places, the Bedouin control a wide range of “power and authority” that
allows them to have exclusive control over the disputed land. This control
also indirectly affects the planning and development processes within the
Bedouin communities, allocation of building lots, construction and use of
public buildings, and even their designation. Such control can provide the
Bedouin with a power capable of blocking the construction of schools,
roads, and the development of neighborhoods and other construction
projects.41
During the planning of the new Bedouin towns,42 the state discovered
that the Bedouin still possess a number of “cards” and that the Bedouin
still use them and manage to block any use of the disputed land. This state
of reality on the part of the Bedouin freezes and even permanently blocks
many projects the state is trying to carry out on their lands, such as
expanding towns borders, marketing new building plots, and building
public buildings.43
The conclusion is that both sides, the state and the Bedouin, control the
land simultaneously. As a result of such simultaneous dual control of the
disputed land, each side is engaged in efforts to block the use of the other.

41. The legal advisor of the local council of Lakiya village and the engineer Mr. Mansour Al-Sana,
told the author that: "The dispute over the land prevents the paving of roads, the development of
neighborhoods, soccer fields, youth centers, community center, main road, and another 8 projects with a
budget of about NIS 9 million, delayed due to problems and disputes on land between the Bedouin and
the state.”
42. Bedouins have always used Bedouin law to control the use of their land. It worked with the
Bedouin mainly because they are committed to Bedouin law.
43. HAGIT SOFER-FOREMAN ET AL., PROGRAM TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
DEVELOPMENT FOR THE BEDOUIN POPULATION IN SOUTHERN ISRAEL (GOVERNMENT RESOLUTION
3708) » BROOKDALE, REPORT NO 1 -- התכנית לקידום הצמיחה והפיתוח הכלכליים של האוכלוסייה הבדואית בדרום
2016( ) דוח ראשון:3708 )(החלטת הממשלה, https://brookdale.jdc.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/71416_Hebrew_summary-1.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2018). They state, “Claims of ownership: In the industrial
zones in question there are many cases in which development is delayed or even stopped due to land
ownership disputes or invasions.” Page V; In the other industrial zones, there are barriers to the use of
land relating to claims of ownership…” Page x; “There are transportation projects that are not being
implemented or others that delay or require a change in planning due to land ownership disputes.” Page
XII; “The dispute over ownership and occupation of land in Bedouin communities, including house
demolitions, creates tension between the local population [Bedouin] and the state authorities and makes
it difficult to create positive cooperation between them.” Page XVII.
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As a result, the disputed land became a “trapped” land that cannot be used
by neither the Bedouin nor the state effectively. (a lose-lose situation).
This dual control creates conflicts in many areas, but mainly in the use
of land for development. On the one hand, Bedouin’s control of the land
does not allow free use of the land by the state (sometimes even if it is for
the Bedouin's interest), which blocks the development of many of the
Bedouin villages in the Negev. On the other hand, the state's control
prevents the Bedouin from using their land, including temporary use for
their basic traditional economy.44 This situation is one of the main reasons
for delaying the development of Bedouin villages, especially those that
were planned and built on Bedouin lands.
F. The Dilemmas and Shortcomings of the Existing Legal Solution
Approach
The current solution approach of the state is problematic, in that it
suffers from several deficiencies. First, reminiscent of the attitude of
Western colonial states toward indigenous peoples, it relies on a factually
unbalanced side of the story, that of the state, and completely ignores the
Bedouin story and narrative. This story is presented from the perspective
of the establishment (the state) in a strong and well-established manner,
and the legal system adopts the state's version almost without questioning
its authenticity. The approach continues to rely on the 50-year-old court's
decisions and on a precedent in the matter of Alhawashelah, which rejects
the Bedouin’s rights in a sweeping manner.
This sweeping rejection of Bedouin land rights also raises a number of
problems, mainly the impression that the approach does not recognize
Bedouin land rights on the collective level, nor does it recognize land
rights of any Bedouin individually. This approach creates an implied
assumption that (1) the Bedouin are not the residents of the locality and
(2) a Bedouin individually can have no right to land.
Second, the approach is based on laws and legal constructions such as
the Mawat doctrine and the definition of a Village from the year of 1858.
At the same time, it does not take into account the legal reality of that
period, particularly, the claim that the Ottoman legal system of that time
recognized “legal pluralism” and strongly adopted many rights under
traditional law, called Alorf.45 Third, this approach does not promote a

44. Regarding the phenomenon of the plowing of Bedouin lands and the destruction of their crops
by the State of Israel, see Nir Hasson, The State Demolished Thousands of Dunums of Bedouin Crops,
RAMALLAH (Feb. 1, 2005), http://news.walla.co.il/item/ 664370.
45. RICHARD J. ROSS, LEGAL PLURALISM AND EMPIRES 1500-1850, 83–85 (2013); ISMAT ABDEL
MEGUID BAKR, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM (IN THE OTTOMAN AND TURKISH
REPUBLICS) 79 (2012).
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practical solution to the problem.46
Further, this approach suffers from problems on the practical, moral,47
legal, and justice levels.48 On the practical level, the rejection of the
recognition of Bedouin rights uncovers a systemic problem, namely,
unwillingness to recognize the uniqueness of the Bedouin land issue and
its impact on a wide range of other very basic rights. 49
On the level of morality and justice, this approach shows that the state
refuses to recognize the minimum rights of the Bedouin in the land, and
the legal system has not succeeded, to date, in issuing decisions that can
rectify this injustice. A jurisprudence in which the Bedouin always lose is
perceived by many Bedouin as arbitrary and depriving that entire Bedouin
population recognition of their unique historical facts.50
Moreover, the state's attitude toward the Bedouin land rights’ issue has
many contradictions and inconsistencies. The state implicitly recognizes
traditional Bedouin rights on the land, but solely for the purpose of
waiving or selling such rights to the State, and for the purpose of receiving
compensation.
Support for this observation comes from the following: (1) the state
enacted a law to regulate land rights and invited the Bedouin to submit
claims for land ownership and prove their rights; (2) the state established
a governmental committee to clarify the rights of the Bedouin; and (3) the
committee recommended compensation to the Bedouin for their rights
(although the matter was paid ex gratia), and that the state pay
compensation, even granting ownership (land title) of 20% of the land in
dispute to the Bedouin who agree to compromise with the state and settle
their land claims.51 However, when it comes to legal recognition of land
rights in dispute, the state denies Bedouin land rights.52
The fact that Israeli courts did not find a single Bedouin with land rights
in the Negev is an outrageous denial and an obliteration of historical facts
evidencing many Bedouin land rights. The Bedouin lived in the Negev
hundreds and even thousands of years before the establishment of the
state. Their land rights were recognized by the Ottomans and the British
46. For example, most of the Bedouin land has not been settled, despite many attempts by the state,
including the settlement process in 1969, counterclaims, and the Goldberg Committee.
47. See SWIRSKI AND HASSON, supra note 9 at 21 (the Albeck Committee report in which she
stated that it is immoral to dispossess the Bedouin from the land they have occupied for many years
without compensation).
48. See generally Ronen Shamir, Suspended in Space: Bedouins under the Law of Israel, 30 L. &
SOC'Y REV. 231 (1996).
49. SWIRSKI AND HASSON, supra note 9, at 32; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26.
50. Alhuzayel, supra note 18.
51. Havatzelet Yahel, Land Disputes Between the Negev Bedouin and Israel, 11 ISRAEL STUDIES
1, 11–12 (2006). See also the ILA decision No. 858.
52. Morad Elsana, The Role of the Judiciary in Dispossessing Indigenous Peoples’ Land: The
Bedouin Case in Israel, 34 J. JURIS.: CONTEMP. LEGAL THEORY 333, 337 (2017).
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Mandate that controlled the region long before the establishment of the
Israeli State.53
G. A Theoretically Intractable Issue
The Bedouin land rights issue, a crisis in the Israeli-Bedouin
relationship, threatens to (1) be intractable and (2) lead to a dead end,
which is the equivalent of a conclusion that there is no possible solution
acceptable to both sides. History supports such a conclusion, but the
historical resilience of the Bedouin people does not concede such a
conclusion, nor does it admit to the absence of resourcefulness in
addressing an issue of such clear relevance to their history, well-being of
their millennially-viable nationhood, and survival.
On the one hand, the state’s oppositional approach to Bedouin land
claims persists, in that the state continues to file counterclaiming lawsuits
against the Bedouin to reallocate ownership of their land. The Bedouin
continue to defend their land ownership in court (or to succumb to
judgments in their absence) and the courts continue to uphold the state's
claims and reject land ownership claims of the Bedouin, abiding by the
Alhawashelah precedent which supports Bedouin land expropriation.
Finally, the Bedouin continue to challenge court doctrines of rejection by
defiantly working to retain possession of their land in multiply inventive
ways which, despite the controversy over legality, evidence limited
success in protecting their land rights.
As noted above, this situation extensively damages both sides. For
example, this prevents economic land development and plowing Bedouin
lands, and it also leads to destruction of Bedouin crops. The result is
economic damage to both the Bedouin and the state, damage to relations
between the state and its Bedouin citizens,54 and deterioration in both the
supportive attitude of Bedouins in the Negev toward their country and in
the sense of identity and self-esteem of Bedouin youth.55
Throughout recent years—in light of the increasing demands of both
sides for use rights to Bedouin land, especially for the development of
Bedouin towns—the attempts to move Bedouin communities from their
villages and replace them with Jewish settlements has increased the
danger and tension caused by the ever worsening Bedouin land rights
crisis, pushing both sides to urgently find a solution.

53. See Morad Elsana JTW, Yiftachel, and Amara.
54. HAGIT SOFER-FOREMAN ET AL., supra note 42, at xvii.
55. See Abu Awad, supra note 3 (describes the changes on Bedouin student’s identity).
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III. RECOGNITION OF THE LAND RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
As I have mentioned elsewhere,56 the dispute over the land rights of
indigenous peoples is not unique to the Bedouin in Israel. Many studies
show that this issue is common elsewhere in the world, especially where
colonial powers encounter indigenous communities. Among the
prominent examples are the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and
several Latin American countries, to mention just a few.
Unlike Israel’s dispute with the Bedouin, in many places in the world,
the parties succeeded in finding a solution, particularly New Zealand,
Canada, and Australia.57 In New Zealand, the Parliament established a
permanent council and a special court for the land of the Maori People
(Waitangi Tribunal) in 1975. This mechanism settled many land claims
filed by indigenous people and returned many lands to their original
Maori owners. In cases where the state could not return the land, the court
ordered the government to pay compensation to the indigenous people.58
In Canada, following the protests of indigenous Canadians in 1991, the
government appointed a committee to examine the indigenous peoples’
rights. In 1996, a commission published a report59 containing
recommendations for sweeping changes, including changes in legislation,
the establishment of institutions, creation of additional resources, land
redistribution, and reconstruction of governments of indigenous peoples.
In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,60 the court accepted indigenous
peoples’ claims regarding many separate areas in northwest British
Columbia.61 In Australia, in the (Mabo 2) case,62 the High Court
recognized the ownership of the indigenous peoples on their land.63
While these examples, which are discussed more fully below, are
noteworthy and show that many countries have found a way to reach a
solution to the indigenous peoples’ land right issue, what is important here
is not the fact that many countries recognized indigenous rights, but rather

56. Morad Elsana, Indigenous Peoples’ Land: The Case of Bedouin Land in Israel, 49 CAL. W.
INT’L L.J. 61 (2018).
57. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 105-07.
58. Id. at 105-06.
59. Highlights from the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, CANADA.CA
(1996), http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014597/1100100014637 [https://perma.cc/XY2KJPXR].
60. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 - SCC Cases (Lexum), 3 SCC 1010,
https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1569/index.do (last visited May 19, 2018).
61. Gerald A. Beaudoin, Delgamuukw Case, THE CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA (Aug. 18, 2017),
https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/delgamuukw-case (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).
62. Mabo v. Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Austl.).
63. See Jeremie Gilbert, Historical Indigenous Peoples’ Land Claims: A Comparative and
International Approach to the Common Law Doctrine on Indigenous Title, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 583,
591, 594 (2007).
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the way they did it.
A. Recognition of Indigenous Rights
Approaches and methods of recognizing indigenous rights vary.
Among the various methods, one can point to two dominant approaches:
(1) recognition of indigenous rights through legislation, and (2)
recognition of rights through court rulings (a form of judicial activism).
Recognition of indigenous rights in legislation has been introduced in
several countries around the world.64 Canada and many Latin American
countries have included in their constitutions or other legislation clauses
that recognize indigenous peoples’ rights. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, and Venezuela adopted this approach and recognized indigenous
rights in their constitutions.65 In Canada, Article 35 of the Constitution of
1982 provides protection for indigenous peoples' rights.66
Recognition of indigenous rights in legislation has led to legal
consequences, including reliance on indigenous legal systems to define
and interpret such rights.67 It should be noted that diversity in the
indigenous world played a key role, in that each state recognized
indigenous customary law in a different way. Colombia has adopted the
doctrine of indigenous legal autonomy recognized in a Special Indigenous
Jurisdiction (SIJ).68 This method was also adopted in Ecuador and
Tanzania.69 Recognition of traditional law is spreading in many countries
around the world, most notably in Latin America. According to
Schmiegelow, many countries in Latin America “are accepting the
premise that traditional legal systems have a rightful place within the
modern state.”70

64. Fajardo, Seider, Borrrows.
65. Mireya Maritza Peha Guzman & Sten Schaumburg-Müller, Legal Pluralism as an Approach
to Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights, 2003 HUM. RIGHTS IN DEV. Y.B. 45, 75 (Lone Lindholt & Sten
Schaumburg-Muller, eds., 2003).
66. Canadian Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
Article 35.
67. Guzman, supra note 64 at 54.
68. Id. at 80 (“Indigenous peoples legal autonomy has been recognized in Colombia under the
form of the so-called Special Indigenous Jurisdiction (The SIJ); see also Justin Shore, Indigenous
Jurisdiction and Human Rights, HUM. RTS. BRIEF (Mar. 28, 2011), http://hrbrief.org/2011/03/indigenousjurisdiction-and-human-rights/.
69. David Pimentel, Legal Pluralism in Post-Colonial Africa: Linking Statutory and Customary
Adjudication in Mozambique, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 59 (2011),
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol14/iss1/2.
70. Helen Ahrens, Access to Justice in Latin America: Challenges to Classifying Legal
Development in the Region, in INSTIT. COMPETITION BETWEEN COMMON L. AND CIVIL L.: THEORY AND
POL'Y 237, 237 (Michele Schmiegelow & Henrik Schmiegelow eds., 2014).
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However, in cases where legislation was not available as a method for
recognition of their rights, indigenous people turned to courts to get
recognition of their land rights.71 Surprisingly, in several cases the courts
did not disappoint them and granted their requests. In Australia, for
example, while for many years the law did not recognize Aboriginal
rights, after many appeals to the courts, recognition of such rights was
achieved.72
Indigenous rights to traditional lands of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas
Tingni Community in Nicaragua73 were recognized by the InterAmerican Court based on their customary law.74 In Richtersveld
Community v. Alexkor Ltd., 2003,75 the Supreme Court of South Africa
recognized indigenous rights according to the customary law of the
Richtersveld community.76
Judicial recognition of indigenous rights was also based on and
recognized customary law, even if indirectly. In Australia, recognition of
indigenous rights was found to inhere in, and was confirmed under,
customary law. In Mabo v. Queensland (1992), the court relied on
indigenous customary law to recognize a source of indigenous property
rights.77 In that case, the court created a new legal doctrine in property
law, and called it a Native Title.78 Through the new doctrine of Native
Title, which is based primarily on land rights under indigenous customary
law, the Australian court was able to recognize land rights indigenous
peoples enjoyed prior to the discovery of Australia.79
In Mabo, the Supreme Court adopted portions of the customary law of
indigenous people. It noted that the customary law of indigenous people

71. See Yuksel Sezgin, Theorizing Formal Pluralism: Quantification of Legal Pluralism for
Spatio-Temporal Analysis, 50 J. OF L. PLURALISM AND UNOFFICIAL L. 101, 102 (2004); Sherman Jackson,
Legal Pluralism Between Islam and the Nation-State: Romantic Medievalism or Pragmatic Modernity?,
30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 158, 158 (2006).
72. See Mabo v. Queensland (NO 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Austl.).
73. Mayagna Community of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, (Aug. 31, 2001).
74. Morad Elsana, The Recognition of Indigenous People’s Land: Application of the Customary
Land Rights Model on the Arab-Bedouin Case in Israel, 7 GEO. J. L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 45,
50 (2015).
75. Richtersveld Community v. Alexkor Ltd., 2003 (2) SA 27 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
76. BRENDAN TOBIN, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, CUSTOMARY LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS – WHY
LIVING LAW MATTERS 113 (2014).
77. See Noel Pearson, The Concept of Native Title at Common Law, AUSTRALIAN HUMAN. REV.,
http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-March-1997/pearson.html (last visited Apr. 14,
2018).
78. Although some land rights were recognized in a few states in Australia prior to Mabo (No. 2),
the decision introduced for the first-time judicial recognition of Aboriginal land rights. See HAZLEHURST,
supra note 11.
79. PETER H. RUSSELL, RECOGNISING ABORIGINAL TITLE: THE MABO CASE AND INDIGENOUS
RESISTANCE TO ENGLISH-SETTLER COLONIALISM 257 (2005).
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is a fundamental characteristic of indigenous property and constitutes the
basis for recognizing indigenous property rights. Critical to the court’s
ruling was the fact that “indigenous peoples were living on land controlled
by their ‘judicial system’ at the time of colonization,” which was found
to constitute a "defining characteristic" of native property rights.80
The court's decision in Mabo not only recognized the Aboriginal
customary law but also recognized it as a legal source of land rights, i.e.
for Native Title.81 As Jessica Weir points out, a native property doctrine
created by the court recognizes the laws, customs, and connection of
indigenous peoples to their land.82 The doctrine thus allows recognition
of the rights of indigenous peoples according to their own tradition,83
indirectly recognizing customary law. 84
Through court rulings, common law relied on Aboriginal customary
law to recognize land rights, confirming that the Australian legal system
recognized Aboriginal customary law as one of Australia's legal sources.
Mabo is a very important ruling critical to recognition of legal pluralism
in Australia, which is defined as diversity of legal sources to recognize
indigenous peoples’ rights.
B. The Recognition of Customary Law in Other Countries: The
Richtersveld Case in South Africa:
In recent years, the recognition of customary law as a basis for
indigenous rights became a global phenomenon.85 Many countries
adopted this approach to recognize the land rights of their indigenous
communities. As noted above, in South Africa, courts relied on the
customary law of the local community to recognize traditional rights.86 In
the well-known decision of Richtersveld Community v. Alexkor Ltd, the
court accepted the appeal of the community based on interests acquired
under customary law.87 The court found that the Richtersveld community
had land rights based on customary law, notably,88 that “an interest in land
80. Id. at 269.
81. See Gilbert, supra note 62 at 591.
82. Jessica K. Weir, Country, Native Title and Ecology, COUNTY, NATIVE TITLE AND ECOLOGY 6
(2012).
83. Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (Austl.).
84. Elsana, supra note 73, at 48.
85. JÉRÉMIE GILBERT, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ LAND RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 66
(2006).
86. See Hallie Ludsin, Cultural Denial: What South Africa’s Treatment of Witchcraft Says for the
Future of Its Customary Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 62 (2003).
87. Yvette Trahan, Richtersveld Community & (and) Others v. Alexkor Ltd.: Declaration of a
"Right in Land" through a "Customary Law Interest" Sets Stage for Introduction of Aboriginal Title into
South African Legal System, 12 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 565, 567 (2004).
88. Id. at 567.
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held under a system of indigenous law is thus expressly recognized as a
“right in land,” whether or not it was recognized by civil law as a legal
right.”89 In Richtersveld, the court recognized customary law as an
integral part of the law of the state. It found that “While in the past
indigenous law was seen through the common law lens, it must now be
seen as an integral part of our law.”90
C. The Case of Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community in Nicaragua
Another case of the recognition of indigenous land rights, according to
traditional law, can be found in the decision of the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights in the case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni of
Nicaragua in 2001. The case presents the link to indigenous peoples’
customary law as a necessary basis for the recognition of indigenous
rights also on the international level (regional-international level). In that
case, the court recognized indigenous peoples’ rights mainly based on
customary law.
In the same decision, the court ruled that the right to property also
includes the right of all indigenous peoples and the protection of their
traditional land.91 The court noted that the right to property under Article
21 of the American Convention on Human Rights92 also includes property
rights held collectively by indigenous groups under customary law. 93 A
decision that recognizes customary law of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas
Tingni was found to be a source of land rights.94
To conclude this point, it can be said that these cases clearly indicate a
practice of recognizing indigenous land rights based on their customary
law. The Australian Court, the South African Court, and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights all have had to rely on customary law
of the indigenous peoples to find the legal source of the indigenous land
rights and be able to recognize it. Therefore, as Toubin notes, “[t]he
89. Richtersveld Community v. Alexkor Ltd., 2003 (2) SA 27 (SCA) at ¶ 9 (S. Afr.)
90. Id. at ¶ 51.
91. S. James Anaya, Divergent Discourses About International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and
Rights over Lands and Natural Resources: Toward a Realist Trend, 16 COLO. J. INT'L. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
237, 245 (2005), https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/843.
92. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
93. The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
(Ser. C) No. 79, at ¶ 164 (Aug. 31, 2001).
94. See also INTER-AM. COMM’N H.R., INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES’ RIGHTS OVER THEIR
ANCESTRAL LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES (2010), http://cidh.org/countryrep/IndigenousLands09/Chap.V-VI.htm; Andrés E. Montalvo, Reservations to the American Convention on Human
Rights: A New Approach, AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 16, no. 2, 269-313 (2001),
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1236&context=auilr;
HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 105-06.
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widespread of the recognition of native title demonstrate[s] a clear state
practice of recognizing customary law as the basis for the identification
and adjudication of IP land rights.”95 In this regard, John Borrows notes
that “[t]he Australian High Court has also recognized that the Common
law draws on Aboriginal legal sources: ‘[n]ative title has its origin in[,]
and is given its content by[,] the traditional laws acknowledged by and . .
. observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a territory. The nature and
incidents of native title must be ascertained as a matter of fact by reference
to those laws and customs.” 96 These views are shared by Prof. Oren
Yiftachel, who notes: “[t]he Awas Tingni (indigenous Mayagna
community) decision represents the ongoing development of the
indigenous land rights perception that [are] based on their local culture
and their traditional legal norms.”97
IV. LEGAL PLURALISM: RECOGNITION OF INDIGENOUS LAND
Legal pluralism has always been relevant to the rights of indigenous
peoples. In recent years, however, many scholars have rediscovered its
virtues as a special approach to understanding and embracing the rights
of indigenous peoples that started pointing to the potential it has for
recognizing indigenous peoples’ rights.98
Before discussing the matter, it important to remember that the
meaning of legal pluralism, according to the leading scholar, John
Griffiths, is "the presence in a social field of more than one legal order."
99 In other words, legal pluralism can exist when several legal systems
apply to different groups in one country.
Like Griffiths, June Prill-Brett notes that “[l]egal pluralism refers to the
existence of different bodies of law within the same sociopolitical space,
which compete for the loyalty of a group of people subject to them.”100
David Pimentel also presents a similar definition. He notes that Legal
pluralism is defined as a situation in which “more than one legal system
95. TOBIN, supra note 75 at 113 (“The widespread recognition of native title demonstrates a clear
state practice of recognizing customary law as the basis for the identification and adjudication of
Indigenous peoples' right over their lands.").
96. John Borrows, With or Without You: First Nations Law (in Canada), 41 MCGILL L. J. 629,
636 n.30 (1995) (quoting Mabo v. Queensland (1992), 107 A.L.R. 1 at 42, 175 C.L.R. 1 (H.C.)).
97. Oren Yiftachel, GOLDBERG COMMITTEE AND BEDOUINS IN THE NEGEV - CHANCE OR RISK?
( הגדה השמאלית: ? ועדת גולדברג והבדווים בנגב – סיכוי או סיכוןHAGADA HASMALIT, https://goo.gl/QTt7uh (last
visited Dec. 12, 2018).
98. See June Prill-Brett, Indigenous Land Rights and Legal Pluralism among Philippine
Highlanders, 28 L. & SOC'Y REV. 687 (1994); Pimentel, supra note 68; Ludsin, supra note 85; Guzman,
supra note 64.
99. John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 1
(1986).
100. Prill-Brett, supra note 97, at 687.
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operate(s) in a single political unit.”101
Jan Goldberg elaborates that “legal pluralism basically means two
things. From a legal angle, it is referred to as a state's recognition in
legislation of a multiplicity of legal sources. From a socio-legal
perspective, it is meant to be a plurality of social fields producing
interacting norms.”102
Keith Richotte defines legal pluralism (in an American context) and
notes: “[t]he concept of legal pluralism, as explained by legal historian
Hendrik Hartog, is the recognition that there is not one uniform,
monolithic American law to which all of us ascribe but rather that the law
can be defined differently by different people and that it can hold more
than one meaning at a time.”103
Ludsin notes that legal pluralism: “[l]egal pluralism is the recognition
within any society that more than one legal system exists to govern
society and maintain the social order.”104 According to de Sousa Santos,
legal pluralism is defined as a situation in which “more than one legal
system operate(s) in a single political unit.”105
Put simply, legal pluralism is a legal diversity that allows for
understanding and “adoption” and the use of other legal principles that
can “see” and “understand” the rights and the legal needs of other groups
living in one sociopolitical field but are normatively outside the group
that dominate and determines the main discourse.
A. Indigenous Peoples and Legal Pluralism: From Exclusion to
Recognition
In the context of indigenous peoples, David S. Clark notes that “Legal
pluralism occurs when indigenous systems of customary law survive in
spite of the superimposition of ‘modern’ national legal norms and
institutions.”106
Legal pluralism is not new, but rather has strong roots in history. 107 In
101. Pimentel, supra note 68, at 59 (quoting BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW
LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 89 (2nd ed. 2002)).
102. Jan Goldberg, Legal Pluralism in the Arab World, 15 J. L. AND RELIGION 447, 447 (2001)
(book review).
103. Keith Richotte, Legal Pluralism and Tribal Constitutions, 36 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV.
447, 447-48 (2010), https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss2/6.
104. Ludsin, supra note 85, at 65 (citing Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Folly of the 'Social Scientific'
Concept of Legal Pluralism, 20 J.L. SOC'Y 192-93 (1993)).
105. Pimentel, supra note 68, at 59 (citing BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW
LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 89 (2nd ed. 2002)).
106. David S. Clark, Legal Pluralism in Latin America Dedication, 1 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 27,
27 (1982).
107. Lauren Benton, Historical Perspectives on Legal Pluralism, 3 HAGUE J. RULE L. 57, 57–59
(2011).
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the not-too-distant past, pluralistic legal systems were particularly
common in colonial countries, where traditional legal systems continued
to exist alongside colonial legal systems, albeit with difficult
limitations.108 At that time, the idea was that certain subjects—such as
commercial transactions—would be governed by colonial law, while
other issues such as personal status would be governed by traditional law.
The English, for example, as Pimentel points out, used to respect
customary law as long as it did not violate the rules of justice.109 While
Ludsin notes that colonial regimes recognized customary law systems
subject to the repugnancy clause.110
1. Exclusion of Customary Law:
Later, especially in the era of the modern national state, most of the
countries of the modern world, particularly the Western World, have
abandoned legal pluralism in favor of legal monism that provides
centrality and greater power to the state.111 Despite this, however, legal
pluralism continued to exist in quite a number of countries such as India,
Tanzania, Israel, and more.112
Although studies show that in many places, like India and Africa,113
Western colonialism has left native law in place, in other places, like
Australia114 and the United States (colonial-settlement countries),
customary law has been excluded and these countries refuse to recognize
indigenous rights under customary law.115 This was especially evident in
cases of land rights and natural resources.116 Canada and Australia, for a

108. Id. at 00.
109. Pimentel, supra note 68, at 67, 73.
110. Ludsin, supra note 85, at 65–66 (“Colonial governments recognized customary law and the
authority of traditional leaders and headmen to try customary law cases to varying degrees throughout the
regions that now make up South Africa. The amount of recognition typically depended on the number of
indigenous people located in a region, although eventually customary law was recognized everywhere . .
. The British, however, would apply customary law only when customary law did not clash with the
‘general principles of humanity observed throughout the civilized world.’ This repugnancy clause was
applied strictly in hopes of ‘civilizing’ the indigenous population.”).
111. Pimentel, supra note 68, at 59.
112. Id. at 59.
113. See Ludsin, supra note 85.
114. In India, for example, the British approved customary law. See Benton, supra note 106, at 61.
115. In Australia, “Justice Blackburn acknowledged it 'as a system of law' while rejecting land
rights in Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd and the Commonwealth of Australia, (1971) 17 FLR 141 at 268."
Brad Morse, Indigenous Peoples and the Law Australia and Canada, 8 LEGAL SERVICE BULL. 104, 108
(1983).
116. B. A. Keon-Cohen, Native Justice in Australia, Canada, and the U.S.A.: A Comparative
Analysis, 7 MONASH U. L. REV. 250, 252 (1980) (“In Australia and Canada, native customary laws,
especially those concerning violent punishments, family arrangements and land have rarely, if ever, been
legally recognized.”).
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long time, refused to recognize indigenous rights under customary law,
and only later, after a protracted struggle, did modern states begin to
include in their legal systems the legal systems of the indigenous
population (or part thereof).117 Australia, for example, did not recognize
traditional Maori law until recently, after the Mabo decision, when it
began to recognize that part of customary law needed to recognize
traditional land rights.118
The exclusion of indigenous law has often been one of the most
sophisticated and cunning ways to exclude indigenous peoples from the
public discourse and to deny their rights.119 Many colonial states ignored
indigenous law and refused to recognize its existence, and thereby refused
to recognize indigenous rights that are protected by their law.120
One has to notice that the forms of denial of indigenous law did not
follow one pattern and were varied from one place to another. Some
countries denied the mere existence of indigenous law in a total manner
and some did so only partially.121 The reasons and excuses on which these
countries relied were diverse, and included many claims, such as the
argument that indigenous law is a primitive law, or that it is an unwritten
law. However, the most prevalent excuse was that indigenous customary
law was inconsistent with basic principles of international human rights
law or principles.122 Other reasons also included traditional colonial
interests, such as denial of indigenous rights. Moreover, in some cases,
there were even ideological reasons that led to the denial of the indigenous
law. For example, Gilbert notes that: “[t]he liberal ideology of the ‘State
Law’ led to the exclusion of the indigenous peoples from the national

117. Guzman, supra note 64 (describing legal pluralism in Latin America).
118. Morse, supra note 114, at 107 ("Aboriginal customary law is still not recognised here as having
any force in its own right, although its existence has been accepted by numerous courts and it is now
influencing criminal sentencing policies in some parts of Australia.").
119. See TOBIN, supra note 75, at 26 (“The application of the doctrine by the British denied
Indigenous peoples the normal protection of the law and imposed English law without any recognition of
Indigenous peoples’’ own customary legal regimes.”); ROSALVA AÍDA HERNÁNDEZ CASTILLO,
NATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS CUSTOMARY LAW: THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE OF INDIGENOUS
WOMEN IN CHIAPAS, MEXICO (2007) (unpublished manuscript, The University of Texas at Austin),
https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/4083 (last visited May 20, 2018).
120. Generally, colonial states recognized some rights for indigenous peoples according to their
customary law. Such as their personal status, their ownership of livestock, and their possessions on other
property. However, as for land and natural resources rights, they applied Western legal theories and
refused to recognize their land. It is clear that this was done for purposes of settlement and the
establishment of a new colonial state.
121. See HARRY BLAGG, CRIME, ABORIGINALITY AND THE DECOLONISATION OF JUSTICE 153
(2008).
122. See Mikano Emmanuel Kiye, Conflict Between Customary Law and Human Rights In
Cameroon: The Role Of The Courts In Fostering An Equitably Gendered Society, 36 AFRICAN STUDY
MONOGRAPHS 75 (2015), https://repository.kulib.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dspace/handle/2433/200274 (last visited
Apr. 7, 2018).
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identity and the dominant political-legal order.”123
Moreover, in some places, states have not only ignored and refused to
recognize the indigenous customary law, but have also even punished the
use of customary law.124 For example, some of the narcotics smoking for
religious and worshiping purposes were banned from American
Indians.125 The Palestinian Authority not only prohibited the use of
Bedouin customary law, but also threatened to punish the use of Bedouin
tribal law, fearing that it would weaken the status of official law and the
status of the newly established Palestinian Authority.126 In South Africa,
witchcraft (part of the local culture) was banned on the grounds that it
contravenes Western law and violates human rights principles.127
The consequences of the denial were disastrous, and they affected the
lives of indigenous people in all spheres and in all areas, but especially in
the areas of land rights, natural resources, and cultural rights.128 They also
discriminated against indigenous peoples in the official legal system and
excluded them from the public discourse. In this context, Rene Paul Amry
notes that “[t]he monistic and ethnocentric view of the law has led to
massive discrimination of cultural differences, by enforcement on a
population that does not live in the same cultural reality as Ladinos.”129
2. The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ Law
In the second half of the twentieth century, indigenous peoples were
among the most disadvantaged groups in the world. During that time,
many indigenous groups engaged in protracted struggles for recognition
of their rights. During the second half of the 19th century their struggle
123. Gilbert, supra note 84, at 257 (quoting Rachel Sieder & Jessica Witchell, Advancing
indigenous claims through the law: reflections on the Guatemalan peace process, CULTURE AND RTS:
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Jane Cowan, Marie-Benedicte Dembour & Richard Wilson eds.,
2001)).
124. BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY, INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE RULE OF LAW AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
PALESTINE, NATIONAL REPORT ON FIELD RESEARCH RESULTS 31-32 (2006).
125. Id. at 31–32.
126. Id.
127. See Ludsin, supra note 85.
128. Id. (describing the deprivation of cultural rights in Africa).
129. Rene Paul Amry, Indigenous Peoples Customary Law and the Peace Process in Guatemala,
L. & ANTHROPOLOGY: INT'L YEARBOOK FOR LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY, 58 (René Kuppe & Richard Potz
eds., 1999) ("The monistic and ethnocentric view of the law has led to massive discrimination of cultural
differences, by enforcement on a population that does not live in the same cultural reality as Ladinos, and
of poverty, by particularly harsh punishment of crimes usually committed by the poor. Striking examples
of this situation are the bad preparation of translators and judges for cases involving Mayas who cannot
speak Spanish, provided there is any interpreter at all, or the fact that persons who cannot afford to be
bailed out stay in prison for years before judgment."); see also TOBIN, supra note 75, at 26 ("The
application of the doctrine by the British denied Indigenous peoples the normal protection of the law and
imposed English law without any recognition of Indigenous peoples’ own customary legal regimes.").
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had also reached the international arena.130 As a result, and after many
years of exclusion, leaders in the international community began to call
upon many countries to recognize the rights of indigenous peoples and,
inter alia, to recognize the indigenous legal systems. 131 Noteworthy here
is the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples (his title at
the time), Mr. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, who stated: “[c]ountries that have
succeeded in integrating traditional law into their formal legal systems
have found that justice is done more effectively.”132 A similar position
introduced the Human Rights Council in 2012.133
As Guzman describes, the multiculturalism that took place in the 19th
century in many countries led to a change in the approach to the law of
indigenous peoples, and it created legal pluralism.134 Guzman further
notes that in the ‘90s, in particular, as a result of changes in the world
order and the changes in the world view of the relationship between the
state and minority groups and as a result of the new vision that sees
multiculturalism as the optimal way of civil co-existence, many countries
have begun to “reassess” their attitudes towards minorities, including
indigenous peoples.135 Multiculturalism has led to changes at all levels.
One of these changes is legal pluralism; i.e. recognition of the legal
systems of other groups.
In recent years, many countries have concluded that recognition of
indigenous law is necessary to build a “modern, multicultural and equal
state,”136 to preserve indigenous peoples and their culture, and to do
historical justice that would benefit the state and the natives on many
levels.137 Many countries, particularly countries that have and welcome
large immigrant populations such as Canada, have come to see legal
monism as an obstacle to recognition of indigenous rights. They
discovered that legal pluralism was essential to understand and embrace
the rights of other national, religious, and cultural groups in the country.
130. See Special Rapporteur, Indigenous peoples and their relationship to land, U.N. SUBCOMMISSION ON THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21 (June 11,
2001) (by Erica-Irene A. Daes), https://www.refworld.org/docid/3d5a2cd00.html; S. JAMES ANAYA,
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2nd ed. 2004).
131. Special Rapporteur, supra note 129.
132. STAVENHAGEN, supra note 1, at 59.
133. Special Rapporteur, supra note 129.
134. Guzman, supra note 64, at 48–50 (describing the states that recognized indigenous peoples'
legal rights).
135. Id.
136. Guzman, supra note 64.
137. See the example of the problems surrounding Bedouin’s lands because of the State’s inability
to recognize their customary law and the Bedouin’s refusal to give up their rights under the State’s law.
See also in this context how the state (forbids bigamy) but the Bedouin continue to practice a polygamous
lifestyle. This is not the best example, but the best example is the actual control of the Bedouin over their
lands in their villages despite the State’s law that do not recognize their land rights.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019

25

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 4

1068

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

These changes have been translated in several fields; in the legal sphere,
as Guzman points out, they were “translated” by legal pluralism.
This legal pluralism offered a “voice” to groups that were weak and
disadvantaged. And, as part of the granting of that voice, advancing legal
pluralism also recognized rights of these groups, rights that were not
recognized in the official law of the state. As part of these changes it also
granted recognition of indigenous rights.138 On the practical level,
Guzman writes, “[l]egal pluralism is one of the phenomena related to the
adaptation of [legal] service to indigenous peoples within local legal
systems through a multicultural policy.”139 Similar arguments can be
found in Svensson's article (quoted in Brill-Britt), where he states that
“[f]or indigenous minorities in the Cordillera, the use of legal pluralism
was a necessary tactic; without it, claims to ancestral lands and domains
would have appeared less legitimate and highly irrelevant.”140
V. LEGAL PLURALISM IN ISRAEL
The State of Israel is an ingathering of the Jewish diaspora from many
parts of the world; it is a collection of Jews who came from Western
Christian countries, from Eastern Muslim countries, or other different
places. These diverse populations in geographical transition brought with
them different norms, different rights according to the law of their
previous homeland, and different rights according to the cultures they
came from. Therefore, from the very beginning, it was clear that legal
monism would not be able to provide an appropriate answer to the
cultural-religious diversity of the country, and very soon monism was
forced to step aside and make room for legal pluralism.141
Legal pluralism in the State of Israel applies to all levels and all parts
of the country. It includes horizontal pluralism, that is, the pluralism of
different legal systems, and vertical pluralism, which consists of differing
legal systems from the past and present. The most obvious examples of
bringing systems from the past into the legal system that exists in Israel
today are laws from the Ottoman legal system as well as from the legal
system that governed the British Mandate. Also, legal pluralism in Israel
138. NATAN LERNER, RELIGION, SECULAR BELIEFS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: SECOND REVISED
EDITION 150 (2012).
139. Guzman, supra note 64, at 51, 54 ("I shall argue that the implementation of legal pluralism
illustrates a way to accommodate indigenous peoples' aspirations about law within States, thereby
effecting interaction between international human rights law and indigenous peoples’ law.").
140. Prill-Brett, supra note 97, at 695 (citing Svensson 1990) (For indigenous minorities in the
Cordillera, the use of legal pluralism was a necessary tactic; without it, claims to ancestral lands and
domains would have appeared less legitimate and highly irrelevant).
141. For a discussion of legal pluralism in Israel, see Sezgin, supra note 70, at 101, where, in the
first sentence he states, “Israel is a legally pluralistic society.” See also Ruth Halperin; Yedidah Stern.
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includes Western norms and norms from the Eastern world. In short, the
legal system governing Israel today is an amalgamation of diverse legal
systems that one is hard pressed to find anywhere else in the world.
Several articles published recently by Israeli scholars on the subject
confirm these statements. They attest that legal pluralism is well
established and is a reality in the current legal system of Israel. 142 One of
the leading articles in this field was written by Ruth Halperin-Kaddari in
1996, followed by two articles by Assi (Issachar) Rosen Zvi, and a third
by Halperin-Kaddari. Both writers describe and analyze legal pluralism
in Israeli law. Ruth Halperin presents and analyzes several recent
decisions143 of the Israeli Supreme Court.144 Halperin’s analysis
demonstrates that legal pluralism in living action is alive and well in
Israel.145
In addition, Yedidia Stern (From the Democracy Institute (2010)),
published an article named “Tzedek Shelly Tzedek Shelkha” (“My
Justice, Your Justice”), in which he elaborates and documents in detail
legal pluralism in Israel. Stern shows that legal pluralism exists in
multiple legal fields in Israel, that is, civil, criminal, and administrative.146
But even without these articles, a comprehensive look shows that the
legal system in Israel is a pluralistic one. It includes several legal systems
that apply to different groups living in the country: the official state law,
rabbinical law for Jews, Sharia laws for Muslims, laws for Christians, and
laws for Druze.147
A. Can Legal Pluralism Promote Bedouin Rights?
The premise underlying this article is that that the answer to the
question— whether legal pluralism in the State of Israel can provide a
solution to the rights of the Bedouin—must clearly be in the affirmative.
Although the answer is not easy and requires discussion, this article can
only start it. This article mentions several important points that determine
the limits of discussion on this matter. The following perspectives are
142. See Issachar (Issi) Rosen-Zvi, The Subject, Community and Legal Pluralism, 23 TEL AVIV U.
L. REV. 539 (2000); Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Rethinking Legal Pluralism in Israel: The Interaction
between the High Court of Justice and Rabbinical Courts, 20 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 683 (1996); Ruth
Halperin-Kaderi, More on Legal Pluralism in Israel, 23 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 559 (2000); Sezgin, supra
note 70; Yedidia Z. Stern, MY JUSTICE, YOUR JUSTICE, https://en.idi.org.il/publications/6697 (last visited
Dec. 6, 2018).
143. HCJ 1000/92 Bavli v. Great Rabbinical Court, PD 48(2) PD 221 [1994] (Isr.) (hereinafter Bavli
case); HCJ 3919/92 Lev v. The Regional Court in Tel Aviv-Jaffa, PD 49 (2) 491 (hereinafter Lev Case).
144. See Bavli case, supra note 142; and Lev Case, supra note 142.
145. Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 143.
146. Stern, supra note 143.
147. Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 141 at 718–19. For more information about legal pluralism in
Israel see also Stern, supra note 143.
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instructive.
First, legal pluralism in Israel is not a product of the modern
multiculturalism such as that which Guzman describes as characteristic
of Western democracies but, rather, at the very least, is one which is
inherited from the Ottomans and the British Mandate. More specifically,
at a minimum, legal pluralism in Israel is the result of the adoption of the
Ottoman legal system or the British Mandate judicial system by virtue of
Article 51 of the Royal Order in the Council on Palestine, 1922-1947.148
Second, this Israeli pluralism has special characteristics. The most
prominent of which is that it recognizes pluralism only in religious
legislations that focus primarily on personal status issues (first-generation
legal pluralism). Thus, it is fundamentally different from the modern
Western pluralism that came as a response to the needs of
multiculturalism. In the legal field, it was translated into legal pluralism,
as Guzman describes.149 This Israeli “first generation legal pluralism” has
evolved to be responsive mainly in the field of religious legislation and
religious rights, which came in response to the “religious diversity” or
multi-religious society during that historical time. Therefore, because this
pluralism lacks a multicultural pigment of the kind that Guzman had in
mind which would support inclusion of other legal systems, such as
traditional legal systems of indigenous peoples, and given the
jurisprudence by which the Israeli court system has thus far rejected
efforts to achieve recognition of Bedouin land rights, it would be hard
under the limited legal pluralism to recognize a Bedouin legal system or
“see” Bedouin rights through it.
This is why the litigation of Bedouin rights in the Israeli courts in the
current format, i.e. the search for their rights within the official legal
system, is not solving the problem. The Bedouin rights are simply not
there in the state legal system but, rather, they are in Bedouin customary
law. Just as the rights of the natives in Australian and Canada are in their
customary law, the same logic applies for the personal status rights of
Jews for matters of marriage and divorce that are found only in Jewish
law. Along with the rights of the personal status of Muslims that are found
only in Muslim law, until recently. A clear proof of this idea can be found
in the Mabo judgment, in the Richardville judgment, and in many similar
decisions that recognize indigenous peoples' rights.
Notwithstanding the foregoing perspectives applicable to the Israeli
legal system, it cannot be denied that, by reviewing the experience of
other peoples, there is a growing understanding that the recognition of
indigenous law is the basis for the recognition of indigenous rights.150
148. Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 141, at 688–89.
149. See generally Guzman, supra note 64.
150. See TOBIN, supra note 75, at 113.
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This basic assumption has been understood and accepted in many places
where there is more than one culture or legal system. However, it is clear
that the “rights” of indigenous peoples does not exist in the official legal
system of the State of Israel, but in another legal system: the legal system
of indigenous peoples. Only in the indigenous peoples’ legal system can
the right and the source of the right be found. Without recognition of the
source of the right, it is not practicable to expect recognition of the right
of Indigenous peoples.
B. In Israel & the Negev
In Israel all state institutions accept, as a working assumption, the
premise that the Bedouin have rights to the land by virtue of their
customary law.151 While it is recognized that customary law cannot be
ignored in dealing with Bedouin land matters, Bedouin customary law is
not officially recognized in Israel’s legal system. For example, in the
course of working on Bedouin land rights, the authorities accept the
assumption, and thus acknowledge, if only implicitly, that a certain land
claimed by a member of one Bedouin tribe is “his land,” meaning such
person or tribe is the “legal owner” of the land, by some law not identified.
By virtue of the foregoing, such member has many important rights and
privileges. This acknowledgement opens the door to negotiations with the
State on compensation for money (and even land), ownership of building
plots, and determination of the identity of third parties to whom the
building plots will be sold. This reasoning process proceeds upon a denial
of reality where ownership is not officially recognized. It is a logical
inconsistency that defies explanation. This leads to the conclusion that, in
practice, the state recognizes Bedouin land rights according to customary
law (albeit in a limited manner), but not sufficiently to support official (or
judicial) recognition of these rights.
Those who oppose the recognition of rights by virtue of customary law
would argue that the state does not need to indulge itself into recognizing
Bedouin rights under customary law.
Indeed, recognition of Bedouin rights under customary law may bring
about a great deal of change in the legal realm, mainly on the practical
level. Such recognition, at the legal level, will translate principles of
multiculturalism and equality into the legal sphere, as Guzman points out.
On the practical level, recognition of Bedouin rights according to their
151. See SWIRSKI AND HASSON, supra note 9, at 21 (citing Plia Albeck (Chair). Oct. 20, 1975. Final
Report of the Team of Experts on the Issue of Land Settlment in the Siyag Area and the Northern Negev.
Jerusalem. (Hebrew)); MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION & HOUSING, GOLDBERG REPORT (2009) (Isr.),
http://www.moch.gov.il/SiteCollectionDocuments/odot/doch_goldberg/Doch_Vaada_Shofet_Goldberg.
pdf.
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custom, done secretly and informally, will become public, and established
in a formal and legal manner.
Such recognition will benefit the Bedouin beyond members of specific
tribes. It will lead to changes in the conception of a land market which
does not exist among the Bedouin in the Negev. It will promote a solution
to the controversial issue of land use, especially the issue of “trapped
land” in the Bedouin villages. It will liberate the “trapped lands” in these
communities and allow them to be used for all residents, and not only for
members of the tribes who own this land according to Bedouin customary
law.
Granting legal recognition of Bedouin land rights will allow Bedouin
“landowners” to trade their land and sell it to other Bedouins.152 This will
allow them to sell land they do not need to people who are desperately in
need of such land. It will solve a separate problem of finding land for
Bedouin who have no land and cannot get such land.
Recognition of customary rights will promote other changes on several
levels: (1) on the legal level, it will bring about adoption of a legal
pluralism for a “second generation” of multiculturalism in an egalitarian
democratic regime; (2) on a social moral level, it will promote a transition
from a colonial-national approach to a more democratic, multicultural,
egalitarian approach that grants legal status to other groups according to
the “language” of their law; and (3) on a personal level, it will promote
recognition of rights under different legal systems including law of the
Bedouin, thus adopting as a general universal principle the requirement
of respect for and recognition of indigenous rights according to customary
Bedouin law.
Recognition by the state of the “first generation” of legal pluralism will
facilitate recognition of rights under another legal system. By similar
analysis, the legislation of the Tribal Courts Regulations153 (article 45 of
The Palestine Order-in-Council of 1922-1947), which continues to be part
of Israeli legislation, may also constitute another catalyst to facilitate the
adoption of Bedouin rights by virtue of their customary law. 154
Of course, adopting the Bedouin law or parts of it is not an easy
challenge both in principle and in practice. In principle, this is a traditional
tribal legal system that is completely different from the legal system in
Israel (which is considered a Western legal system). It includes several
152. Notably, the Bedouin have no problem selling the surplus land to other Bedouin. Historically,
the Bedouin traded in their land and sold it to Bedouins and Jews. See Noa Kram, The Naqab Bedouins:
Legal Struggles for Land Ownership Rights in Israel, INDIGENOUS (IN)JUSTICE: HUM. RTS. L. AND
BEDOUIN ARABS IN THE NAQAB/NEGEV 137 (Ahmad Amara et. al. eds., 2012); Yiftachel, Kedar, and
Amara, supra note 8, at 108 (citing the same example of Al-Uqbi tribe selling land to a Jewish organization
in 1913).
153. Tribal Court Regulation of 5715, 1937, KT 483, 123 (Isr.).
154. Elsana, supra note 73, at 61–62.
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legal principles that are not acceptable by many modern legal systems,
such as collective responsibility for individual actions, women rights, and
blood feud.155
But at the same time, one has to remember that the Bedouin legal
system includes elements (laws and legal rules) that are acceptable to
most of the Bedouin society, and it continues to serve the Bedouin
population in the Negev,156 especially in areas such as conflict resolution
and the establishment of various rights in the areas of personal status and
property rights.157
Such challenges exist wherever countries have recognized customary
legal systems. In the United States, the American legal system recognized
the traditional legal system of the Native Americans, permitting them to
apply it in their own legally defined boundaries but with the limitations
that such indigenous systems will be subordinated to fundamental
doctrines set forth in the American Constitution, including “the right to
due process [of law], equality, and other principles protected by the US
Constitution.”158
At the same time, institutionalizing customary legal systems often push
native populations into a path of change and adaptation to the
development of traditional societies, which are naturally not static and
change mainly as a result of exposure to modernization processes. Most
important is that they would be subordinated to various societal or
institutional forms of legal supervision that could ensure justice and
prevent extreme decisions that deviate from basic principles of justice.
See for example, the recent scandalous decision, Al-Naami vs. Alatrash
in the Negev in 2014. In that case, a tribal court ordered one of the parties
to pay a compensation of 235,000 Jordanian dinars, an amount equal to
more than NIS 1 million, only because Mr. Al-Naami shared a post on
Facebook that Mr Alatrash claimed to have slandered him. 159
The results of such societal or institutional legal supervision may be
very positive and may prevent undesirable acts such as honor killings,
blood feuds among the Bedouin, or the expulsion of tribes from their
155. CLINTON BAILEY, BEDOUIN LAW FROM SINAI AND THE NEGEV: JUSTICE WITHOUT
GOVERNMENT 60 (2009).
156. Id. at 7.
157. Id. at 60–67.
158. James Poore, The Constitution of the United States Applies to Indian Tribes, 59 MONT. L.
REV., 51, 51 (1998), https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol59/iss1/4 ("The extent of Indian jurisdiction,
both regulatory and judicial, is hotly contested because of the general perception that Indian tribes and
their courts are not subject to the United States Constitution, and thus due process, equal protection, and
other constitutional protections are not available to the constituents and litigants. This article addresses
the validity of that perception.”).
159. Yasir Al-Uqbi, A Precedent- Share" on Facebook costs 235 thousand JD, BLDTNA (Oct. 28,
2014)  ألف دينار) سابقة235  “شير” على الفيسبوك يكلف:(سابقة: \, https://goo.gl/wA7kmM.
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homes as part of collective punishment among Bedouins. Supervision of
these matters (even if not by the state, i.e. the supervision by an acceptable
people's council of the Bedouin) will restrain the decisions of the tribal
courts and end the era of “wild law without supervision” as it is today.
VI. CONCLUSION
Generally, as the examples presented in this article show, advocacy of
indigenous rights from within the official monistic state legal system
often fails to achieve recognition of their rights. One of the main reasons
for this failure is that traditional rights of indigenous peoples, especially
land rights, do not exist in the judicial system of the state (which is,
generally, a colonial justice system that, for long time, was based on
values and interests of colonialism). The modern state legal systems
usually do not include the values/norms of indigenous peoples and thus
fail to serve their needs, especially their legal needs, and therefore they
do not recognize them.
The Bedouin case in Israel shows that even when legal pluralism exists,
it is not enough to recognize indigenous peoples’ rights. To recognize
their rights, there is a need for a modern legal pluralism: a second
generation of legal pluralism, which is a part of multiculturalism whose
real purpose is to provide a legal service for all groups according to their
own culture and law.
Therefore, to solve the problem of rights recognition, there is a need
for a fundamental change, both in principle and in technical levels, in the
approach of the parties (especially the establishment, i.e. the state) about
the subject. A change is needed that aims at abandoning the narrow legal
monism and moving forward toward real legal pluralism that answers the
needs of the indigenous groups, according to the new view of
multiculturalism taking place in the modern Western world.
On the specific level of Bedouin land rights in Israel, this article shows
that the current way Bedouin seek a solution to their problem of land
rights recognition through the Israeli legal system has not worked. In
other words, it fails to bring recognition to their land rights. It also shows
that the continuation of the litigation to recognize the rights of the
Bedouin from within the current Israeli legal system (monistic or semipluralistic) will not solve the problem. Therefore, to recognize the
Bedouin right to land claimed or potentially claimed by both Bedouins
and the state, the Israeli legal system has to change its current approach
and must start acting according to the principles of legal pluralism (not
only in the judiciary but also in the legislature—the Knesset).
In addition, this article shows that despite the many studies showing
that legal pluralism exists in Israel, the legal pluralism in Israel is “semi-
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pluralism,” an “old fashion of legal pluralism,” which the State of Israel
inherited from the Ottoman legal system that ruled the region from the
beginning of the 12th century. This legal pluralism is a narrow pluralism
because it is based on a religious legal pluralism, recognizing such
pluralism in cases of religious legal systems, and is therefore different
from the modern legal pluralism that occurs in the Western world as part
of the changes that are taking place as part of the development and
recognition of multiculturalism. Such recognition of multiculturalism
aims to recognize the rights of all various groups. Not only on religious
diversity, but also on a broader basis, which includes mainly cultural
differences, and differences based on ideology and gender.
Therefore, evaluating the situation based on the present status of legal
pluralism in Israel, would be very difficult if not impossible for Israeli
law to recognize Bedouin land rights. It will take, and needs to take, a
courageous step that changes the legal system and expands the existing
legal pluralism from a narrow religion-based legal pluralism to a modern
“real” liberal legal pluralism that includes all the other cultural groups and
their legal systems operating in the country, and recognizes the rights of
the various groups as part of multiculturalism taking place in the world.
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